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NOW, I’M LIBERAL, BUT TO A DEGREE: AN ESSAY
ON DEBATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND
DISCRIMINATION
FRANCIS J. BECKWITH*
ABSTRACT
This essay is a critical analysis of the book authored by John Corvino, Sherif Girgis,
and Ryan T. Anderson, Debating Religious Liberty and Discrimination. The book
offers two contrary views on how best to think about some of the conflicts that have
arisen over religious liberty and anti-discrimination laws, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018). One position is
defended by Corvino, and the other by Girgis and Anderson. After a brief discussion
of the differing views of religious liberty throughout American history (including the
American founding), this essay summarizes each side’s arguments. This is followed
by two sets of critical comments: (1) Neither side adequately explains why the
celebration of weddings—the focus of the most prominent cases—are thought to have
religious significance by many citizens; and (2) Each side is making arguments that
the other side would have made until just recently. It seems that yesterday’s liberals
have become today’s moralists and vice versa.
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Now, I’m liberal, but to a degree
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You must think I’m crazy!
—Bob Dylan, I Shall Be Free No. 10 (1964)1
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What is the most coherent way to fairly assess the conflicts that have arisen in
recent years between claims of religious liberty and the enforcement of laws that
prohibit discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in public accommodations?
In their recent book, Debating Religious Liberty and Discrimination,2 John Corvino,
Sherif Girgis, and Ryan T. Anderson offer two different, though sometimes
overlapping, ways to think through these seemingly intractable conflicts.
This essay is a critical evaluation of the book. I begin with an overview of the
differing accounts of religious liberty in the American Founding, followed by a
summary of the arguments of Corvino, Girgis, and Anderson. I then move on to offer
comments on two fronts: (1) I argue that the analyses from both sides fail to address
why weddings—the events at which these conflicts between religious liberty and
antidiscrimination laws often arise—are believed to have religious significance by
many devout citizens, even when these ceremonies are performed by public servants
or clergy that these citizens’ ecclesial authorities do not recognize; and (2) I argue that
each side seems to be making arguments that, until the day before yesterday, would
have been uncontroversially ascribed to advocates of the other position. For this
reason, as I will argue, the case of Girgis and Anderson sounds like old-fashioned
Political Liberalism, even though their earlier works on same-sex marriage (SSM)
would lead you to think otherwise. Alternatively, Corvino—at times—sounds like a
traditional moralist, even though it was politically liberal reasoning that served as the
philosophical grounding of Obergefell v. Hodges,3 the decision holding that it is
unconstitutional for any government in the United States not to recognize a same-sex
marriage.
I. CHURCH, STATE, AND THE CONSTITUTION
If you think you have found a coherent theory of American church-state
jurisprudence that seamlessly connects and explains all of the United States Supreme
Court’s holdings from its first religious case in 18784 to today, then you do not
understand American church-state jurisprudence. Of course, you may be an originalist
in constitutional interpretation and concede this point, arguing that the absence of
theoretical coherence means that some holdings are mistaken because the justices who
penned those opinions embraced the wrong theories. You may reason that what the
Court needs to do is get back to reading the Constitution as its first readers originally
understood. But, as Michael Zuckert has persuasively argued, there may have been
more than one original understanding in the American Founding. 5
1 BOB DYLAN, I Shall Be Free No. 10, on ANOTHER SIDE
Records 1964).

OF

BOB DYLAN (Columbia

2

JOHN CORVINO, RYAN T. ANDERSON & SHERIF GIRGIS, DEBATING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY
DISCRIMINATION (2017). One side of the debate has a single author, Corvino, while the
other side is co-authored by Girgis and Anderson.

AND

3

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).

4

Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).

5

Michael Zuckert, Freedom of, Freedom for, and Freedom from Religion: The Contested
Character of Religious Freedom in America, ONLINE LIBRARY OF LAW & LIBERTY (NOV. 2,
2016),
http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/freedom-of-freedom-for-and-freedomfrom-religion-the-contested-character-of-religious-freedom-in-america/.
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Zuckert maintains that one can find three different, though overlapping,
understandings of religious liberty in Early America, each of which can be seen today
in differing perspectives on the proper role of religion in public life. He calls these
views freedom-of-religion, freedom-for-religion, and freedom-from-religion.6 The
first view, known as freedom-of-religion, is the view with which we are probably most
familiar. It has its roots in the work of the Seventeeth Century English philosopher,
John Locke,7 whose influence on the American Founding is well-known.8 Locke
argued that the commonwealth (or state) and religion (or church) have separate
jurisdictions.9 The former exists “for the procuring, preserving, and advancing of [the
people's] Civil Interests,” which Locke identifies as “Life, Liberty, Health, and
Indolency of the Body, and the Possession of outward things, such as Money, Lands,
Houses, Furniture, and the like.”10 It is the government's duty, “by the impartial
Execution of the equal Laws, to secure unto all the People in general, and to every one
of his Subjects in particular, the just Possession of these things belonging to this
Life.”11 On the other hand, the state’s authority does not extend to the “Care of Souls,”
for its “Power consists only in outward force: But true and saving Religion consists in
the inward persuasion of the Mind; without which nothing can be acceptable to
God.”12 The main point of the Lockean perspective is to eliminate state coercion on
matters of religion.13 It is not to entirely eradicate religion from public life. Thus, as
Zuckert explains, for Locke, “the magistrate may publically confess his religion,
practice his religion in public, even encourage others to adhere to his religion. But
what he may do as a matter of advocacy he may not do coercively.”14 So, under
freedom-of-religion, the common manifestations of “ceremonial deism”15 (e.g.,
legislative prayer, the President ending speeches with “God bless America,” labeling
“In God We Trust” on our coinage, etc.) would be permissible, but exemptions to
neutral and generally applicable laws that concern civil interests—such as, “Life,
Liberty, Health, and Indolency of the Body”16—would not, because the government
6

Id.

7 See, e.g., JOHN LOCKE, A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION (James H. Tully ed., William
Popple trans., Hackett Publishing 1983) (1689).
8

See THOMAS PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN REPUBLICANISM:
THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS AND THE PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE (1988).
9

THE MORAL VISION OF

LOCKE, supra note 7.

10

Id. at 26.

11

Id. at 26.

12

Id. at 27.

13

Id.

14

Zuckert, supra note 5.

15
Justice William Brennan wrote: “[S]uch practices as the designation of ‘In God We
Trust’ as our national motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance to
the flag can best be understood, in Dean Rostow's apt phrase, as a form a ‘ceremonial deism,’
protected from Establishment Clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote
repetition any significant religious content.” Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 688, 716 (1984)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).
16

LOCKE, supra note 7, at 26.
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has a duty to secure these civil interests “by the impartial Execution of the equal
Laws.”17 For this reason, Zuckert argues that the sorts of exemptions allowable under
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), as in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby
Stores,18 would not be permissible under a freedom-of-religion regime.19
Freedom-for-religion, writes Zuckert, has its roots in the Pilgrims and Puritans
who emigrated to North America in the early Seventeenth Century. 20 Seeking to live
in accordance with what they understood to be authentic Christianity—as compared
to what they had experienced under the authority of the Church of England—they set
out for the New World to create political communities that would accomplish that
end.21 For these settlers, the purpose of politics was not merely to provide citizens with
material goods for their temporal flourishing, but to prepare human beings for the next
life.22 This means that law and government existed for the sake of the church and its
mission in saving and sanctifying souls. Although Puritan theocracy eventually
vanished from North America, vestiges of its freedom-for-religion reflexes remain
with us under a more generic (or pan-sectarian, as Zuckert puts it) understanding of
religion’s good and the duty of our political institutions in protecting, and in some
cases advancing, it.23
In comparsion to advocates for freedom-of-religion and freedom-from-religion,
proponents for freedom-for-religion, according to Zuckert, “are much friendlier to
governmental encouragement and aid to religious institutions and practices”24 as well
as conscience-claims when they conflict with neutral and generally applicable laws
that substantially burden religion. So, in the Hobby Lobby case, freedom-for advocates
“stood clearly on the side of recognizing the claim of conscientious employers not to
be obliged to follow the mandates in the Affordable Care Act [ACA] that these

17

Id.

18

Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).

19 Zuckert explains: “So, to again take the Hobby Lobby case as an example, it is clear that
the pure freedom-of-religion position would dismiss the claims of the company’s owners,
assuming we accept Obamacare as in fact having a valid secular purpose. To do otherwise would
mean that the law would not be uniform across the entire population, which uniformity is one
measure of a good law. It would also mean that some religions were favored over others and
would encourage a race between religions for privileged position, just the sort of thing the
original devotees of ‘freedom of religion’ deeply wished to avoid. So while the freedom-ofreligion notion supplies a robust—indeed an absolute—protection for religious freedom
understood as religious belief and practice in themselves, it does not offer great protection to
claims to religious freedom that run up against public policies seeking to effectuate the valid
secular ends of the state.” Zuckert, supra note 5. For a response to Zuckert’s analysis, see
Francis J. Beckwith, Religious Liberty After Locke, ONLINE LIBRARY OF LAW & LIBERTY
(November 7, 2016), http://www.libertylawsite.org/liberty-forum/religious-liberty-after-johnlocke/.
20

Zuckert, supra note 5.

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id.

24

Id.
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employers found religiously objectionable.”25 Of course, as Zuckert points out,
freedom-for does not mean conscience always trumps laws that have a “valid secular
purpose,” though it does mean, contra freedom-of, that claims of conscience may serve
as a legitimate legal basis for filing law suits “seeking exemption from otherwise
applicable civil laws.”26
Freedom-from-religion has not been, until recently, much of a force in American
history, though Zuckert sees it in the alliance between Enlightenment liberals, Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison, with Christian religious minorities (e.g., Baptists) in
their opposition to Patrick Henry’s bill in Virginia that would have created a special
tax to directly support “teachers of the Christian religion.”27 For this reason, Zuckert
characterizes freedom-from as having its roots in the Radical Enlightenment, but not
necessarily always being anti-religious in the American context.28 Freedom-from
advocates support a strict separation between church and state. 29 Such advocates
would oppose laws that are intentionally created to burden religious liberty, reject
religious establishment, and are against religious exemptions to neutral and generally
applicable laws that have a valid secular purpose.30 In this regard, freedom-from and
freedom-of are aligned. However, freedom-from rejects freedom-of’s generous
tolerance of ceremonial deism, since any claim that the state is speaking for all citizens
on religious matters, such as “In God We Trust” on currency, is not only false, but has
nothing to do with anyone’s status as a citizen. This is because freedom-from
advocates generally see any endorsement of religion, even the non-coercive sort, as de
facto religious establishment, whereas freedom-of advocates typically do not.31 In this
regard, freedom-of and freedom-for disagree with freedom-from because freedom-for
supporters think that ceremonial deism is acceptable due to it endorsing a generic
theism, whereas freedom-of proponents tolerate ceremonial deism because it does not
involve state coercion of religious belief or conscience. 32 As to the question of where
freedom-from advocates would align on cases like Hobby Lobby, Zuckert writes,
“Don’t even ask.”33
Despite the differences between these three positions, there is an overlapping
consensus on two-points:

25 Id. Technically, Zuckert is wrong to say that the mandates are in the ACA. They were
actually issued by the Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) after the passage of the
ACA as result of regulative powers given by the ACA.
26

Id.

27

A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion (1784),
https://www.religlaw.org/content/religlaw/documents/billteachersrel1784.htm (last visited Feb.
17, 2019).
28

Zuckert, supra note 5.

29

See id.

30

See id.

31

See id.

32

See id.

33

Id.
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First, that the state cannot constrain any practice of religion per se. It cannot
prescribe or proscribe any beliefs or practices of religion as religion or for
religious purposes. Second, in whatever way the state does rightly touch
religion, it cannot do so in a way that gives a privileged place to any given
religion.34
But, as we have seen, the disagreements arise over questions as to what constitutes
the necessary conditions for religious establishment. Must it involve coercion or an
official state church, or any sort of endorsement however modest, or something
else?—and whether legislatures or courts should carve out exemptions for religious
believers substantially burdened by neutral and generally applicable laws.
II. RELIGIOUS LIBERTY AND ANTI-DISCRIMINATION LAWS
The most pressing contemporary legal and political conflicts that arise as a
consequence of these differing understandings of church-state jurisprudence are in full
display in Debating Religious Liberty and Discrimination.35 To use a boxing
metaphor: in one corner is Corvino, a philosophy professor at Wayne State University,
and in the other corner are Anderson, a political scientist at the Heritage Foundation,
and Girgis, a recent graduate of Yale Law School and Ph.D. candidate in philosophy
at Princeton. This “boxing match” ultimately results in an old-fashioned, knock-down
drag-out debate, absent the rhetorical excesses and personal acrimony that often
accompanies such discussions in the ever more shrill public square, dominated as it is
by social media, the venue least capable of sustaining anything resembling civil
discourse. This is not to say that the authors pull their punches, rather, it is that they
play fair, show respect for their opponent, and take no cheap shots.
The book begins with an introduction co-authored by all three contributors. 36
Entitled, “New Challenges, Old Questions,” it provides an overview of the book’s
division of labor as well as a brief history of religious freedom in America. 37 What
follows are four chapters. The first two, one authored by Corvino (“Religious Liberty,
Not Privilege”) and the other by Anderson and Girgis (“Against the New Puritanism:
Empowering All, Encumbering None”), present each side’s case.38 These chapters
consist of lengthy and sophisticated, though accessible, treatises. They are also
exceptionally well-written, and well-argued. Unlike his counterparts Anderson and
Grigis, who are trained in political science and law, Corvino pens the clearest and most
economical account of the United States Supreme Court’s free exercise and
establishment jurisprudence I have ever read. 39 What stands out in the Anderson and
Girgis chapter is their compelling presentation of the new natural law (NNL) view that
the basic goods for human flourishing (e.g., life, health, knowledge, religion, play,
friendship) do the best job of explaining why the government should protect certain
34

Id.

35

CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2.

36

Id. at 1.

37

Id. at 6.

38

Id. at 20, 108.

39

Id. at 25–31.
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fundamental rights, including religious free exercise.40 Because presentations of the
NNL are often peppered with technical jargon incomprehensible to the uninitiated, 41
Anderson’s and Girgis’ exposition is a breath of fresh air. The book’s final two
chapters—one by Corvino and the other by Girgis and Anderson—consist of replies
by each author to the aforementioned treatises of the book’s earlier chapters.42
What prompted the publication of this debate-book are the recent, high-profile,
conflicts between religious liberty and sexual orientation anti-discrimination laws that
have arisen during the ascendancy of the legal recognition of same-sex marriage
(SSM).43 Some of the most well-known of these cases involve vendors, who, for
reasons of religious conscience, cannot use their talents in cooperating in the
celebration of a same-sex wedding.44 The United States Supreme Court decided the
most prominent of such cases, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights
Commission,45 in June 2018 in favor of Masterpiece.46 A same-sex couple asked the
owner of a bakery, Jack Phillips, to custom design a cake to celebrate their same-sex
wedding.47 After refusing their request, 48 the couple filed a complaint with the
Colorado Civil Rights Division. 49 The Colorado Civil Rights Division held that there
was probable cause that Masterpiece, a public accommodation, had violated

40

Id. at 124–43.

Take, for example, these comments by John Finnis: “The objects of intelligent human
acts are intelligible goods, basically the intrinsic goods such as life or knowledge . . . the goods
to which the first principles of practical reason, all per se nota and indemonstirabilia, direct
us.” John Finnis, Aquinas and Natural Law Jurisprudence, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO
NATURAL LAW JURISPRUDENCE 35 (George Duke & Robert P. George eds., Cambridge Univ.
Press 2017).
41

42

CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 207, 235.

43 The first U.S. state to recognize same-sex marriage (SSM) was Massachusetts in 2003,
as ordered by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, the State’s highest court. See
Goodridge v. Dept. Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 970 (Mass. 2003). In 2015, the United States
Supreme Court held that the non-recognition of SSM in any jurisdiction in the United States
violated both the Due Process Clause and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). Between these two cases there
were many state referenda, as well as federal and state court decisions on the issue, with a variety
of different results. Early on, opponents of SSM were mostly victorious (at least when it came
to legislation and referenda), but that began to change as public opinion moved more in the
direction of SSM, culminating in the Obergefell ruling.
44 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723
(2018).
45

Id.

46

Id. at 1732.

47

Id. at 1724.

“Phillips informed the couple that he does not ‘create’ wedding cakes for same-sex
weddings. He explained, ‘I’ll make your birthday cakes, shower cakes, sell you cookies and
brownies, I just don’t make cakes for same-sex weddings.’ The couple left the shop without
further discussion.” Id.
48

49

Id. at 1725.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

7

148

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:141

Colorado’s anti-discrimination law.50 The couple then filed a formal complaint before
an administrative judge, who granted summary judgment in their favor against the
bakery.51 After losing in the Colorado Court of Appeals52 and being denied review by
the Colorado Supreme Court,53 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in
the summer of 2017.54 In similar cases in New Mexico,55 Washington,56 and
Oregon57—invovling a photographer, a florist, and a baker respectively—the first two

50

Id. at 1726–27.

51

Id. at 1726.

52

Craig v. Masterpiece Cakeshop, Inc., 370 P.3d 272, 294–95 (Colo. App. 2015).

53

Jordan Steffen, Colorado Supreme Court Won’t Hear Lakewood Baker Discrimination
Case, DENVER POST (Apr. 25, 2016), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/04/25/coloradosupreme-court-wont-hear-lakewood-baker-discrimination-case/.
Because the question presented to the Court asks “whether applying Colorado’s public
accommodations law to compel Phillips to create expression that violates his sincerely held
religious beliefs about marriage violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First
Amendment,” this case was as much a free speech case as it was a free exercise case. Question
Presented, Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723
(2018). However, in his majority opinion, Justice Anthony Kennedy, demurs on the free speech
question and rules for Phillips on free exercise grounds: “The free speech aspect of this case is
difficult, for few persons who have seen a beautiful wedding cake might have thought of its
creation as an exercise of protected speech. This is an instructive example, however, of the
proposition that the application of constitutional freedoms in new contexts can deepen our
understanding of their meaning . . . . Whatever the confluence of speech and free exercise
principles might be in some cases, the Colorado Civil Rights Commission’s consideration of
this case was inconsistent with the State’s obligation of religious neutrality.” Masterpiece
Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1723. The free speech aspect may not be as difficult as Justice Kennedy
thinks, for three combined reasons. First, cake design can be copyrighted and trademarked.
Hannah Brown, Having Your Cake and Eating It Too: Intellectual Property Protection for Cake
Design, 56 IDEA 31, 31–56 (2016). This is because, as Brown notes, “[c]ake has evolved not
only in taste and in ingredients, but also in meaning, and has become the symbol of a celebration,
used to signify a special moment in one's life such as a birthday or a wedding. Cakes have
become works of art often created specially by cake design artists.” Id. at 33. Second, in Matal
v. Tam, the Supreme Court held that the government's refusal to register trademarks that offend
“violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. It offends a bedrock First Amendment
principle: Speech may not be banned on the ground that it expresses ideas that offend.” Matal
v. Tam, 173 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). So, it follows that trademarks (and by default, copyrights)
are protected under the First Amendment's free speech clause. Third, the Court has long
recognized that freedom of speech includes the freedom to not speak: “The right of freedom of
thought and of religion as guaranteed by the Constitution against State action includes both the
right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at all, except in so far as essential
operations of government may require it for the preservation of an orderly society, as in the case
of compulsion to give evidence in court.” W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
645 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring).
54

55

Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 59 (N.M. 2013).

56

State v. Arlene’s Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 548 (Wash. 2017).

57

Klein v. BOLI, 410 P.3d 1051, 1056 (Or. Ct. App. 2017); In re Klein, No. 44-14, 34
BOLI 102, at *52 (Bureau Or. Labor Indus. 2015).
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resulted with each state’s highest court finding against the vendors,58 while in the
Oregon case the vendors lost in the state’s intermediate appellate court.59 In a departure
from these cases, the Supreme Court in Masterpiece sided with the vendor.60 In his
majority opinion, Justice Kennedy made the observation that the state’s civil rights
commission had shown hostility toward the owner’s religious beliefs.61 Such hostility,
he argued, is “inconsistent with the First Amendment’s guarantee that our laws be
applied in a manner that is neutral toward religion.”62
This conflict between sexual orientation anti-discrimination laws and religious
conscience has also resulted in other sorts of disputes, though sometimes not making
their way to litigation. Such examples include: the question of tax-exempt status for
religious schools that require faculty, students, and/or staff to abide by traditional
norms of sexuality morality;63 a county clerk who for religious reasons refused to sign
same-sex wedding licenses;64 religious adoption agencies that limit child adoption to
opposite sex married couples;65 a church that will not allow its rental properties to be

58

Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d at 568; Elane Photography, LLC, 309 P.3d at 77.

59

Klein, 410 P.3d at 1087.

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S.Ct. 1719, 1732
(2018).
60

61

Id.

62

Id.

63

During oral arguments for Obergefell, Justice Samuel Alito, relying on the holding of
Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983), asked U.S. Solicitor General Donald B.
Verrilli if private religious institutions of higher education could lose their tax-exempt status if
the Court were to declare SSM a Constitutional right. General Verilli replied: “You know, I
don't think I can answer that question without knowing more specifics, but it’s certainly going
to be an issue. I don’t deny that. I don’t deny that, Justice Alito. It is—it is going to be an issue.”
Transcript of Oral Argument at 36–38, Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
64 Alan Blinder & Tamar Lewis, Clerk in Kentucky Chooses Jail over Deal on Same-Sex
Marriage, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/04/us/kim-davissame-sex-marriage.html.
65 See Maggie Gallagher, Banned in Boston: The Coming Conflict Between Same-Sex
Marriage
and
Religious
Liberty,
WKLY. STANDARD
(May
16,
2006),
http://www.weeklystandard.com/banned-in-boston/article/13329; UNITED STATES CONFERENCE
OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CATHOLIC ADOPTION SERVICES (2018),
http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/religious-liberty/discrimination-against-catholicadoption-services.cfm; Michael J. O'Loughlin, Philadelphia Suspends Foster Care Partnership
with Catholic Social Services over L.G.B.T. Issues, AMERICA MAG. (Mar. 20, 2018),
https://www.americamagazine.org/faith/2018/03/20/philadelphia-suspends-foster-carepartnership-catholic-social-services-over-lgbt.
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used for same-sex wedding celebrations;66 and a farmer who was expelled from a local
farmer's market because he wrote on Facebook that he opposes SSM. 67
III. THE DEBATE: THE CURRENT LAW AND WHAT IT SHOULD LOOK LIKE
Given the Supreme Court’s ruling in Employment Division v. Smith68—in which
the Court held that a neutral and generally applicable law that burdens religion does
not violate the free exercise clause as long as the government has a rational basis for
the law—religious dissenters in such disputes have little chance of winning unless
they can argue: (1) that it is really a First Amendment free speech case (as part of the
question before the Court in Masterpiece affirmed);69 (2) the government entity
adjudicating the case has shown hostility toward the defendant's beliefs and thus
violates her free exercise rights (as the Supreme Court found in Masterpiece);70 (3) the
law under scrutiny is a federal law (and thus the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
[RFRA]71 applies);72 or, (4) it is a state law from a state that has its own state-RFRA.
Because this is more or less the current condition of free exercise jurisprudence in the
United States, the Corvino and Girgis and Anderson debate is not over courtroom
strategy for litigants whose side either may take in any of these disputes (though some
of what they say does in fact provide insight and clarification on the arguments in such
cases). Rather, their debate is over what the law should look like for religious liberty
given the legal recognition of SSM and the existence of sexual orientation antidiscrimination laws throughout the U.S.
Because each side in this debate offers a sophisticated and multilayered case for
their respective position, I cannot possibly do justice to their arguments in this review.
For this reason, I offer a brief summary of each side’s view followed by some critical
observations and comments.
66

See Bill Bowman, $20G Due in Tax on Boardwalk Pavilion: Exemption Lifted in Rights
Dispute, ASBURY PARK PRESS (Feb. 12, 2008); Jill P. Capuzzo, Group Loses Tax Break Over
Gay
Union
Issue,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Sept.
18,
2007),
https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/18/nyregion/18grove.html.
67

Apple Farmer Loses Market Spot, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 31, 2017),
https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/michigan/articles/2017-05-31/farmer-sues-gaymarriage-views-cost-him-market-spot.
68

Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879, 883 (1990).

69

Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Co. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1732 (2018).

70 “The official expressions of hostility to religion in some of the commissioners’
comments—comments that were not disavowed at the Commission or by the State at any point
in the proceedings that led to affirmance of the order—were inconsistent with what the Free
Exercise Clause requires.” Id.
71 Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–14, 107 Stat. 1488
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-4). In response to the standard used in Employment Division v.
Smith, RFRA applied the following to all laws in the U.S., local, state, and federal: “Government
may substantially burden a person's exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application
of the burden to the person—(1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and
(2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”
72 Although RFRA, as originally written, was intended to be applied to all laws, the
Supreme Court has only held it as unconstitutional in its application to non-federal laws. See
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516, 536 (1997).
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A. Corvino: Religious Freedom but No Religious Privilege
Corvino recognizes that there are large swaths of religious citizens—mostly
observant Christian, Jews, and Muslims—who embrace moral theologies that
condemn sexual relations outside of male-female marriage. He also recognizes that
under the United States Constitution, citizens have the liberty to hold and practice such
beliefs. But, all citizens (even non-religious ones) possess the same liberty. Thus, a
Jew is free to attend synagogue and listen to his rabbi on the Sabbath, just as an atheist
is free to believe and teach that the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob does not exist.
However, according to Corvino, problems arise when a religious citizen enters the
worlds of business, government, or education and requests special treatment under the
law that: (1) privileges religion over non-religion;73 (2) causes non-minimal harms to
third parties;74 (3) results in another’s dignitary harm;75 or, (4) gives a cover for unjust
discrimination.76 Using Zuckert’s taxonomy, Corvino’s view is somewhere between
“freedom-of-religion” and “freedom-from-religion.” Because his baseline for
assessing the justice of a claim to religious liberty is the principle of equality, and
because he wants the law at the same time to give special deference to certain identities
(e.g., religion, race, gender, sexual orientation, marital status, etc.) in the context of
business, government, or education, privilege (for Corvino) is permissible as long as
it furthers equality.77 Corvino writes:
It may seem paradoxical that the law seeks to promote equality by special
attention to certain characteristics . . . But the paradox is specious.
Sometimes the goal of equal treatment is best achieved by a process that
gives certain factors an extra scrutiny. And antidiscrimination law does
treat all people equally with respect to those factors—after all, everyone
has a race, a sex, a sexual orientation, and so on. 78
Thus, a law that bars discrimination based on sexual orientation in a public
accommodation is justified, even though it is an exemption from ordinary property
law.79 A business owner can, for example, bar his daughter’s mean ex-girlfriend from
employment because he does not like her, but not because she is a lesbian.

73

CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 49.

74

Id. at 43–45.

75

Id. at 72–74.

76

Id. at 68-71.

77

Id. at 74–75.

Id. at 75 (Although acknowledging that “not everyone has a religion . . .
antidiscrimination laws that enumerate ‘religion’ generally protect agnostics and atheists too.”).
78

79 Andrew Koppelman, Gay Rights, Religious Accommodations, and the Purposes of
Antidiscrimination Law, 88 S. CAL. L. REV. 619, 640 (2015) (“The general rule that governs
business transactions, both public accommodation and employment, is contract at will. In most
states, most businesses have the privilege of refusing service to anyone for any reason or no
reason. They need not justify these actions to any official. Antidiscrimination laws, such as the
Civil Rights Act, are exceptions.”).
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Because religion is one of those identities that Corvino believes requires special
deference to further equality, and because he is also suspicious of judicially created
exemptions to neutral and generally applicable laws, 80 he provides a sophisticated
conceptual framework by which equality and the right sort of privilege can be
maintained without collapsing into incoherence. For this reason, he defends some
legislatively created exemptions for religious believers, though he rejects both RFRA
and state-RFRAs (as they are understood and defended by their advocates).81 Corvino
argues that: (1) their “compelling state interest/least restrictive means” standard is too
overbroad, since it would allow for judicially created exemptions permitting certain
religious citizens a privilege to unjustly discriminate; 82 (2) they are too underinclusive, since they do not allow exemptions for comparable conscience claims that
are conventionally non-religious (e.g., the pro-life atheist doctor who does not want to
participate in an abortion);83 (3) their application may result in third-party harms, as
some have argued is a consequence of the Hobby Lobby case;84 (4) they should not
apply to for-profit corporations;85 and (5) RFRA and state-RFRAs do not restore the
pre-Smith standard of scrutiny, as its advocates claim, but rather exceed that standard,
if there ever really was one. 86
80 Corvino is sympathetic to Justice Antonin Scalia's majority opinion in Emp’t Div., Dep’t
of Human Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS,
supra note 2, at 31 (“I think Justice Scalia was correct. Let me be clear: I don't believe that
Oregon should have outlawed peyote, for Native Americans or for anyone else. But given that
it did, it ought to apply the law consistently. It should not matter whether Smith and Black were
devout adherents of the Native American Church, or casual ‘Cafeteria’-style adherents, or
people who wanted to try the religion on for size, or nonbelievers who were simply curious
about peyote. If peyote isn’t dangerous, it shouldn’t be against the law. If it is dangerous,
religious beliefs do not change its potency. To make people’s obligation to obey laws depend
on whether the law fits their religious beliefs is generally a mistake.”).
81

Id. at 32.

82

Id. at 32–34.

83

Id. at 57–58.

84

Id. at 43–44.

85

Id. at 42–43.

86 Id. at 31. Corvino cites the Court's sustaining of state “blue laws” (e.g., laws prohibiting
business operations and alcohol sales on Sunday) during the pre-Smith era. Id. at. 44. Corvino
also alludes to the fact that during the so-called “pre-Smith” era, the Supreme Court seemed to
apply an intermediate scrutiny standard while claiming to apply strict scrutiny. See, e.g., United
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261–63 (1982); Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n,
485 U.S. 439, 450 (1988); Lee, 455 U.S. at 261–63 (Stevens, J., concurring). In his concurring
opinion in Lee, Justice John Paul Stevens makes a similar point: “According to the Court, the
religious duty must prevail unless the Government shows . . . that enforcement of the civic duty
‘is essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest’ . . . . That formulation of the
constitutional standard suggests that the Government always bears a heavy burden of justifying
the application of neutral general laws to individual conscientious objectors . . . . The Court
rejects the particular claim of this appellee, not because it presents any special problems, but
rather because of the risk that a myriad of other claims would be too difficult to process. The
Court overstates the magnitude of this risk because the Amish claim applies only to a small
religious community with an established welfare system of its own . . . . Nevertheless, I agree
with the Court’s conclusion that the difficulties associated with processing other claims to tax
exemption on religious grounds justify a rejection of this claim. I believe, however, that this
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On the other hand, Covino would support a more moderate “intermediate scrutiny”
RFRA or state-RFRA, such as “allow[ing] exemptions from generally applicable rules
that burden religion unless denying the exemption is ‘substantially related’ to an
‘important government interest.’”87 Additionally, he would extend “religion” to
include comparable conscience claims held by non-religious citizens.88 When it comes
to religious institutions (e.g., churches, synagogues, or mosques), he would,89 as the
United States Supreme Court has done, 90 affirm the “ministerial exception,” which,
“grounded in the First Amendment . . . precludes application of [employment
discrimination laws] . . . to claims concerning the employment relationship between a
religious institution and its ministers.”91 Although he maintains that the most
important reason for the ministerial exception “is that it involves jobs whose required
qualifications are beyond the purview of those outside the faith[,]”92 he worries that it
may be abused by “religious officials . . . by stretching the term ‘minister’ to apply to
a wide variety of employees, including those whose main duties have nothing to do
with religion.”93
B. Girgis and Anderson: Religious Freedom but No Secular Puritanism
Although one could say that Girgis and Anderson are the “conservatives” in this
debate, their case for religious liberty often sounds like a brief for traditional liberal
understandings of individual rights. As the title of their proposal indicates, they see
the proliferation of the application of antidiscrimination legislation to religious
vendors, and the apparent hostility exhibited by government agencies toward
businesses like Hobby Lobby and charitable organizations like the Little Sisters of the
Poor,94 as a kind of enforcement of public morals by a secular confessional state.95—
Girgis and Anderson view this as a religious version of which was established by John
Winthrop and his Puritan followers after their arrival in the New World. 96
Girgis and Anderson begin with an overview of the public policy flashpoints that
have arisen under five general categories since the ascendancy of SSM: (1) private
reasoning supports the adoption of a different constitutional standard than the Court purports to
apply.” Lee, 455 U.S. at 261–63 (Stevens, J., concurring).
87

CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 104.

88

Id. at 65.

89

Id. at 85.

90

See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171
(2012).
91

Id. at 188.

92

CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 86.

93

Id.

94

See Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).

Although he does not use the phrase “secular confessional state,” J. Budziszewski
provides the theoretical framework for the idea in his book chapter. J. Budziszewski, The
Strange Second Life of Confessional States, in REASON, REVELATION, AND THE CIVIC ORDER:
POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE CLAIMS OF FAITH 86–88 (Paul R. DeHart & Carson Holloway
eds., 2014).
95

96

CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 108.

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2019

13

154

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:141

adoption agencies, hospitals, and charities; (2) educational institutions: creeds and
codes of conduct; (3) wedding and relationship professionals; (4) government
employees; and (5) First Amendment defense acts (FADAs). In each of these areas,
Girgis and Anderson argue that the government should be deferential (though not
capitulating in every case) to religious conscience. However, like Corvino, they would
include, under religious conscience, those citizens who may not believe in God (e.g.,
a noble pagan pacifist prison guard who cannot in good conscience escort a capital
offender to the gas chamber). 97
In making their case, Girgis and Anderson start with a philosophical justification.
They argue that religious conscience is an aspect of the good of religion, one of several
basic human goods.98 Among the other goods are “health, knowledge, play, aesthetic
delight, and skillful performance of various sorts.”99 They are basic because they are
the basis for our acts of practical reason. So, for example, I eat my wife’s baked kale
because I want to be healthy and I want to play. (If I don’t eat the kale, my wife won’t
let me play basketball with my buddies). Because these goods are basic, it makes no
sense to provide a justification for pursuing them. They seem to be just good inthemselves. If I tell you that I eat kale because I want to be healthy, it would be odd
for you to ask me why I would want to be healthy. According to Girgis and Anderson
the good of religion gets cashed out in a similar way. If I tell you that I have been
pursuing questions on ultimate matters—e.g., whether there is a transcendent source
of existence and meaning—it would be strange for you to ask me why I would want
to know the answers to such questions. There seems to be something distinctly human
in both making such inquiries as well as attempting to live out in practice what one
believes are their answers.
Because religion is a basic human good, and because the government has an
obligation to advance the common good, Girgis and Anderson maintain that a just
regime should provide citizens with as much freedom as possible to live out their
religious convictions with integrity.100 But, unlike living out the other basic goods, the
good of religion requires special protection. Why? Because religious conscience, in
most instances, is more fragile and fundamental to a person’s integrity than practices
that instantiate the other basic goods.101 If, for example, the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) were to forbid you from building a basketball court in the west corner
of your backyard because it is too close to an endangered species habitat, there are still
other places at which you could build a court, or even play basketball. Or, you can
engage in other forms of play and amusement. However, if you are a pro-life physician
and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) requires pro-life physicians
to perform abortions or risk losing their medical licenses, you must either violate your
conscience or end your career.102

97

Id. at 126.

98

Id. at 124–25.

99

Id. at 125.

100

Id.

101

Id. at 134.

102

Id. at 138–43.
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Girgis and Anderson also argue that religion is essential in preserving civil society
and limiting the jurisdiction of the state.103 Further, they argue that this understanding
was central to the thinking of leading figures in America's Founding. 104 As they note:
The American founders . . . celebrated religious integrity as a source of
moral limits on government, grounded in each person’s duty to seek the
truth about ultimate matters and to live by it. As James Madison wrote in
his Memorial and Remonstrance, ‘the Religion then of every man must be
left to the conviction and conscience of every man,’ because of a prior duty
to seek out the truth about God and the created order.105
Girgis and Anderson point out that we should not be surprised that the pluralism
of contemporary American culture, including its religious pluralism, is the
consequence of a free society that protects fundamental rights that allow citizens to
pursue the basic human goods as they see fit. 106 But, when combined with the growth
of the administrative state, as well as the changing mores on matters concerning human
intimacy, we should also not be surprised that conflicts between religious conscience
and public policy have increased dramatically. To reduce these conflicts in a way that
they believe is just and fair as well as consistent with the basic good of religion, Girgis
and Anderson defend the RFRA,107 support state-RFRAs108 and federal state First
Amendment Defense Acts (FADA),109 and offer criteria by which a government would
be justified in passing anti-discrimination laws,110 including those intended to protect
sexual minorities. Given their criteria, Girgis and Anderson argue against the passage
of a Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity (SOGI) anti-discrimination law.111 Using
Zuckert’s taxonomy, Girgis and Anderson’s position is somewhere between
“freedom-for-religion” and “freedom-of-religion.”

103

Id. at 143–47.

104

Id. at 144.

105

Id. (quoting Letter from James Madison to Honorable the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Virginia on a Memorial Remonstrance (June 20, 1785),
https://founders.archives.gov/documents/Madison/01-08-02-0163); Girgis’ and Anderson’s
phrase after the quote from Madison shifts his meaning just enough to conform to their New
Natural Law understanding of the basic good of religion. But if one reads Madison in context,
he is not appealing to “a prior duty to seek out the truth about God and the created order," but
rather, “‘the duty which we owe to our Creator’ . . . . It is the duty of every man to render to the
Creator such homage and such only as he believes to be acceptable to him.” Id. (quoting Article
XVI of the Virginia Declaration of Rights of 1776).
106

CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 147–49.

107

Id. at 153.

108

Id. at 150, 152.

109

Id. at 121–24.

110

Id. at 162–84.

111

Id. at 184–206.
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C. Some Critical Questions and Observations
Although my own views on the issues debated in this book are generally closer to
the positions defended by Girgis and Anderson, 112 the comments that follow will
consist of remarks addressed to both sides of the debate. Because the book tackles so
many different topics and arguments, I will single out only a few issues that I believe
are especially ripe for further exploration.
1. Taking Rites Seriously? 113
This book is presumably about conflicts between religious liberty and antidiscrimination laws that have arisen as a result of the legal recognition of same-sex
marriage. Yet, missing from both sides’ analyses is an account of why many citizens
believe marriages and weddings to have religious significance, even when they are
conducted under the auspices of authorities outside of one’s own religious tradition,
including secular authorities. Consider, for example, the practice of Christian
baptism—an event that, in some Christian denominations, is considered a sacrament
like marriage.114 Suppose a local congregation of Jews for Jesus plans to conduct
several adult baptisms at a nearby river and want to celebrate the event with a catered
post-baptismal reception held at the church. 115 They approach restaurant owner, Mr.
Saul,116 an observant Orthodox Jew, and request an estimate for his services. Mr.
112

Id.; see, e.g., FRANCIS J. BECKWITH, TAKING RITES SERIOUSLY: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE
REASONABLENESS OF FAITH 172–208 (2015); Francis J. Beckwith, Religious Liberty After
Locke, LIBERTY AND LAW (Nov. 7, 2016), https://www.lawliberty.org/liberty-forum/religiousliberty-after-john-locke/; Francis J. Beckwith, Political Liberalism, Religious Liberty, and
Christian Higher Education, Symposium on Religious Liberty and Christian Higher Education
(2017), https://twokingdoms.cune.edu/symposium-beckwith
Although “taking rites seriously” is also the title of my 2015 book, I wish I could take
credit for coming up with that clever pun, inspired as it was by the title of Ronald Dworkin's
classic monograph. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977). The honor goes to
Notre Dame philosophy professor Paul J. Weithman, who used the phrase in 1994 as the title of
an article. See Paul J. Weithman, Taking Rites Seriously, 75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 272 (1994). Because
titles cannot be copyrighted, I am happy to report that I take copyrights seriously.
113

114

Other Christian traditions consider it an ordinance commanded by Jesus, and thus should
be performed merely as a matter of obedience, but not because it removes original sin or is a
means of grace. See THOMAS J. NETTLES ET AL., UNDERSTANDING FOUR VIEWS OF BAPTISM 152
(John H. Armstrong & Paul E. Engle eds., 2007).
115 It was brought to my attention by a friend that Jews for Jesus is a Christian ministry and
not a denomination or church, and thus does not have any congregations. See About Who We
Are, JEWS FOR JESUS, https://jewsforjesus.org/about-who-we-are (last visited Nov. 23, 2018); Is
“Jews
for
Jesus”
Jewish
or
Christian?,
JEWS
FOR
JUDAISM,
http://jewsforjudaism.org/knowledge/articles/is-qjews-for-jesusq-jewish-or-christian/
(last
visited January 21, 2019). Nevertheless, we can still imagine that such congregations could
exist, and in fact, some do under the label of “Messianic Congregations.” See Moishe Rosen,
Choosing Between a Local Church and a Messianic Congregation, JEWS FOR JESUS (Feb. 1,
1989),
https://jewsforjesus.org/publications/havurah/havurah-mm89/choosing-between-alocal-church-and-a-messianic-congregation/. As a Catholic, I take no position on the theological
legitimacy of such congregations from the perspective of historic Judaism.
116 By using fictional names like “Mr. Saul” and “Mr. Paul,” and later “Mr. Picture,” “Mr.
Pious,” “Mr. Splitfoot,” and a few others, I am shamelessly borrowing from the inventive and
entertaining way Corvino offers his own illustrations in his contribution to the book. Among his
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Saul’s business is family owned and run and all of his employees are all close relatives,
all of whom are observant Orthodox Jews like Mr. Saul. After he provides the
estimate, the congregation’s pastor, Mr. Paul, tells Mr. Saul that the name of his
congregation is “Jews for Jesus Community Church” and that the five people to be
baptized were raised in Jewish homes and had converted to Evangelical Christianity
just two weeks ago. In response, Mr. Saul says that he cannot cater the event, because
he cannot cooperate with a celebration of apostasy from Judaism. Mr. Paul leaves not
only disappointed, but feels discriminated against. After all, he reasons, Mr. Saul is an
observant Jew and thus denies the religious efficacy of baptism and would likely have
no problem catering post-baptismal celebrations held in Christian churches whose
primary mission is not to target Jews for evangelization. So, Mr. Paul concludes that
Mr. Saul harbors animus against his particular church and that his refusal to provide
services to the church violates a local ordinance that forbids discrimination based on
religion in public accommodations. Mr. Paul subsequently files a complaint with the
local Human Rights Commission. In his reply to the complaint, Mr. Saul argues that
he is in fact not discriminating against the congregation based on religion, but rather
is basing his denial of service on the nature and context of the liturgical event with
which he was asked to cooperate and what his own tradition tells him is an act of
public apostasy from the Jewish faith. He also argues that he would be more than
happy to provide catering to any member of the congregation as long as the service
does not involve him cooperating with the celebration of apostasy. The Human Rights
Commission does not buy it. They rule:
In conclusion, the forum holds that when a law prohibits discrimination on
the basis of religion, that law similarly protects conduct that is inextricably
tied to religion. Applied to this case, the forum finds that Respondents'
refusal to provide catering for a baptismal celebration for Complainants
because it was for their Jews for Jesus baptism was synonymous with
refusing to provide catering because of Complainants' religion.
The aforementioned hypothetical ruling by the fictional Human Rights
Commission is in fact a slightly edited version of an actual quote from a 2015 case
brought before Oregon's Bureau of Labor and Industries (BOLI).117 It is a case
mentioned by both Corvino118 and Grigis and Anderson.119 It involved a business
many characters are “Mr. Chess,” “Mr. Pacifist,” “Mr. Mission,” and “Mr. Burqa.” However,
Corvino should not be blamed for my failure to measure up to his creativity. CORVINO,
ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 58, 67.
In re Klein, No. 44-14, 34 BOLI 102, at *56 (Bureau Or. Labor Indus. 2015) (“In
conclusion, the forum holds that when a law prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation, that law similarly protects conduct that is inextricably tied to sexual orientation . . .
. Applied to this case, the forum finds that Respondents’ refusal to provide a wedding cake for
Complainants because it was for their same-sex wedding was synonymous with refusing to
provide a cake because of Complainants’ sexual orientation.”). On December 28, 2017, the
Klein's lost their appeal in an Oregon intermediate appellate court. Klein v. BOLI, 410 P.3d
1051, 1056 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
117

118

CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 78–79, 86–87, 89, 93.

119

Id. at 251–53.
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called “Sweetcakes by Melissa,” whose owners Melissa and Aaron Klein refused to
make and design a cake for the wedding of a lesbian couple, Rachel and Laurel
Bowman-Cryer. The Kleins argued that, because of their religious beliefs about the
nature of marriage, and the Bible’s prohibition of homosexual conduct, they could not
assist the Bowman-Cryers in celebrating what they believe is an abomination.120 The
lesbian couple filed a complaint, arguing that the Kleins had violated Oregon law’s
prohibition against sexual orientation discrimination in public accommodations. 121
Although not enthusiastic about the amount the Kleins were fined by the BOLI
commissioner ($135,000),122 Corvino nevertheless maintains that the commissioner
ruled in favor of the correct party—the Bowman-Cryers.123 He also agrees with the
commissioner’s conclusion that the event, namely the same-sex wedding, is
“inextricably tied to sexual orientation,” and thus, a refusal to cooperate with the
ceremony’s celebration, is a refusal to serve someone based on their sexual
orientation.124 To make his point, Corvino draws two brief analogies:
The Kleins are unwilling to sell cakes in precisely those instances where
the cakes manifest their customers sexual orientation. That’s sexual
orientation discrimination. By analogy, it would be religious discrimination
if the Kleins said that they would sell cakes to Jews, but not bar mitzvahs,
or they would sell cakes to Catholics, but not for First Holy Communion. 125
In light of our story of Mr. Saul and the Jews for Jesus Church, Corvino’s analogies
not only provide little support for his position, they reveal an impoverished
understanding of the nature of certain religious practices that does not take rites
seriously.
According to Corvino’s account: “When Rachel and her mother finally arrived for their
appointment, Melissa's husband, Aaron Klein, asked for the name of the bride and groom.
(Melissa was out that day). After Rachel explained that there would be two brides, Aaron stated
that Sweet Cakes did not make cakes for same-sex weddings because of his and Melissa’s
religious convictions. This upset Rachel, who began crying and was escorted out by her mother,
who attempted to console her. Rachel felt ashamed, and was particularly concerned that she had
embarrassed her mother, who not long before had disapproved of her daughter's homosexuality.
When Rachel’s mother return to the shop to explain to Aaron how ‘she used to think like him,’
but her ‘truth had changed.’ He quoted Leviticus 18:22: ‘You shall not lie with a male as one
lies with a female; it is an abomination.’ (Leviticus makes no reference to lesbianism, but let's
leave that aside.)” Id. at 78–79 (footnote omitted).
120

“[A]ll persons within the jurisdiction of this state are entitled to the full and equal
accommodations, advantages, facilities and privileges of any place of public accommodation,
without any distinction, discrimination or restriction on account of race, color, religion, sex,
sexual orientation, national origin, marital status or age . . . .” OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §
659A.403(1) (West 2003).
121

122 “One could argue that the penalty was excessive, an example of the extremes of our
litigious society. (I'm inclined to agree.)” CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 79.
123

Id.

124

In re Klein, No. 44-14, 34 BOLI 102, at *52 (Bureau Or. Labor Indus. 2015).

125

CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 80.
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Imagine, for example, a devout Southern Baptist—Mr. Bread—who does not
believe that the Eucharist is the literal body and blood of Christ, as Catholics,
Orthodox, and some Anglicans believe. In fact, given the Catholic practice of
Eucharistic Adoration—which involves kneeling, meditating, worshipping, and
praying before a consecrated host—Mr. Bread comes to the conclusion, as do many
Protestants, that the Catholic belief in Eucharistic realism is a form of idolatry
forbidden by the Bible.126 Suppose Mr. Bread is a baker who is asked by his Catholic
neighbor, Ms. Papist, to make and design a cake for her daughter’s First Holy
Communion. Mr. Bread declines precisely because he does not want to assist in the
celebration of what he believes is unbiblical. And yet, he tells his dear friend, “I would
be more than happy to make and design a cake for your daughter’s birthday or
graduation, but not her First Holy Communion.” So, in contrast to Corvino, if one
takes rites seriously, it appears perfectly sensible to say that one “would sell cakes to
Catholics, but not for First Holy Communion.”
For religious believers, especially serious ones across the Catholic-Protestant
divide, issues like the nature of the Eucharist—not to mention apostolic authority,
baptism, ministerial ordination, the indissolubility of marriage, justification by faith,
and what constitutes idolatry—are fundamental to their religious and ecclesial
identity. These are not tangential or trite questions for most of these believers. 127 Lest
we forget, the Protestant Reformation resulted in decades of political, military, and
ecclesiastical tumult over these very questions. 128 St. Thomas More (1478–1535) was
willing to suffer the punishment of beheading for refusing to sign an oath that affirmed
the supremacy of the king over the pope—a political conflict that was triggered by an
ecclesial dispute over the nature of marriage.129 On the other hand, More, while Lord
Chancellor of England, enforced anti-heresy laws and the punishments for them. 130
This is why a careful reading of Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration—the
document most influential in forming many of the American Founders’ understanding
of religious liberty131—reveals that the contentious nature of such theological
questions is precisely why Locke argued that religious toleration is necessary.132 So,
126

See, e.g., Glenn Davis, The Error of Eucharistic Adoration, THE GLORIOUS DEEDS OF
CHRIST (Sept. 25, 2012), http://www.canonglenn.com/2012/09/25/error-eucharistic-adorationupdated/.
127

In fact, these issues are so important to some of us that we actually reassess and change
our ecclesial allegiance after much prayer, study, and wise counsel. See, e.g., FRANCIS J.
BECKWITH, RETURN TO ROME: CONFESSIONS OF AN EVANGELICAL CATHOLIC (2009).
128 Justin Kirk Houser, Is Hate Speech Becoming the New Blasphemy?, 114 PENN. ST. L.
REV. 571, 577 (2009).
129

Gilbert
Huddleston,
St.
Thomas
More,
NEW
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/14689c.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2018).

ADVENT

130 See St. Thomas More, The Apology, in THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ST. THOMAS MORE 45
(J. B. Trapp ed. 1979).
131 See Kevin Vance, The Golden Thread of Religious Liberty: Comparing the Thought of
John Locke and James Madison, 6 OXFORD J. L. & RELIGION 227 (2017).

Locke writes: “It is not the diversity of opinions (which cannot be avoided), but the
refusal of Toleration to those that are of different Opinions, (which might have been granted)
that has produced all the Bustles and Wars, that have been in the Christian World, upon account
of religion. The Heads and Leaders of the Church, moved by Avarice and insatiable desire of
132
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Corvino, by not taking rites seriously, has everything entirely backwards. It is not the
case that “the Kleins are unwilling to sell cakes in precisely those instances where the
cakes manifest their customers sexual orientation.”133 Rather, the Kleins are unwilling
to make and design cakes for precisely those occasions where the cakes are used to
celebrate a rite that the Kleins believe makes a mockery of their religious faith’s
understanding of marriage. Just as the government should not force Mr. Saul, a Jew,
to help celebrate a rite that he believes constitutes apostasy from Judaism, the Christian
Kleins should not be forced by their government to help celebrate a rite that they
believe the Christian faith forbids. (However, whether that should be secured by a
state-RFRA or a more generous reading of the free exercise clause is another question
altogether).
Although Girgis and Anderson offer an elegant and sophisticated case for their
position, like Corvino, they say very little about why certain religious citizens, qua
religious citizens, seem particularly perturbed about cooperating with the celebration
of same-sex weddings. To be sure, Girgis and Anderson provide a philosophical
account to explain why religious citizens who refuse to cooperate are not motivated
by bigotry or animus against LGBT people: “[These refusals] rest on the beliefs that
marriage is the one-flesh union that only man and woman can form, that sexual activity
belongs in marriage, that biological sex is to be embraced or that motherhood and
fatherhood are essential.”134 But, it is not clear how that, by itself, helps establish the
religious liberty of these citizens not to cooperate with what they believe is an
illegitimate rite. It is undoubtedly true that certain religious beliefs—such as those
about marriage, God’s existence, the soul, the personhood of nascent human life,
objective morality—may be defended with philosophical arguments that do not rely
on the deliverances of Scripture or magisterial authority. 135 In fact, Girgis and
Anderson, along with Robert P. George, have authored a book-length treatment that
offers such an argument for the normativity of male-female marriage.136 But, a
philosophical case for the reasonableness of a religious belief is not what makes the
belief religious—at least as we conventionally use that adjective. Suppose I accept
Aristotle's argument for an Unmoved Mover 137 or David Oderberg’s argument for
hylemorphic dualism.138 By doing so, does that mean I now hold such beliefs about
Dominion, making use of the immoderate Ambition of Magistrates and the credulous
superstition of the giddy Multitude, have incensed and animated them against those that dissent
from themselves; by preaching unto them, contrary to the Laws of the Gospel and to the Precepts
of Charity, that Schismaticks and Hereticks are to be outed of their Possessions, and destroyed.
And thus have they mixed together and confounded two things that are in themselves most
different, the Church and the Commonwealth.” LOCKE, supra note 7, at 55.
133

CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 80.

134

Id. at 194.

135 I have made that very point. See BECKWITH, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 112,
at 22–51.
136

SHERIF GIRGIS, RYAN T. ANDERSON, & ROBERT P. GEORGE, WHAT IS MARRIAGE?: MAN
AND WOMAN: A DEFENSE 4 (2012). It is an argument with which I am sympathetic.
137

ARISTOTLE, PHYSICS (R. P. Hardie & R. K. Gaye trans. 1993) (350 B.C.E.).

138

DAVID ODERBERG, Hylemorphic Dualism, in PERSONAL IDENTITY, 70, 72 (Ellen Frankel
Paul, Fred D. Miller, Jr. & Jeffrey Paul eds., 2005).
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God and the soul religiously? Or, are they merely philosophical beliefs that happen to
cohere with beliefs I otherwise hold by faith? 139 These arguments may convince
skeptics that these beliefs are at least reasonable, which, as I have argued elsewhere, 140
may be more important to the judiciary’s assessment of some religious liberty claims
than many of us would care to admit.141 But these arguments do not capture the
religious nature of the beliefs that our Constitution is supposed to protect. If such is
the case, then what does?
It seems to me that in the case at hand—whether certain religious vendors should
be given an exemption not to cooperate with same-sex weddings—what makes
weddings distinctly religious in contrast to special occasions like birthdays, baby
showers, bachelor parties, or high school reunions, is the notion of divine sanction. It
is the idea that God has specially revealed that marriage—like clearly religious
activities such as baptisms, ordinations, bar mitzvahs, but unlike clearly secular
activities such as home ownership, gun licensing, philosophizing—has a special place
in the created order that cannot be fully grasped by natural reason. For example, the
Catholic Church teaches:
Scripture speaks throughout of marriage and its “mystery,” its institution
and the meaning God has given it, its origin and its end, its various
realizations throughout the history of salvation, the difficulties arising from
The latter, by the way, is the view held by the Catholic Church: “‘Our holy mother, the
Church, holds and teaches that God, the first principle and last end of all things, can be known
with certainty from the created world by the natural light of human reason.’ Without this
capacity, man would not be able to welcome God's revelation. Man has this capacity because
he is created ‘in the image of God.’” But, “[w]hat moves us to believe is not the fact that revealed
truths appear as true and intelligible in the light of our natural reason: we believe ‘because of
the authority of God himself who reveals them, who can neither deceive nor be deceived.’”
CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, 36, 156 (2nd ed., United States Catholic Conf. 2000)
(quoting First Vatican Council (1870) and 1 Genesis 1:27).
139

140

BECKWITH, supra note 112, at 130–36, 210–18.

141

Consider two examples. First, it seems highly unlikely, per Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg’s dissent in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2797 (2014), that
Hobby Lobby would have won under the RFRA if it had requested a complete exemption from
the Affordable Care Act (ACA) because its owners were Christian Scientists who believed that
relying on medicine was contrary to authentic faith. Why? Such a view is clearly unreasonable
(or in the “procedural” lingo of the courts, inconsistent with the government’s compelling
interest to provide health care). But the pro-life understanding of the human embryo—the view
held by the owners of Hobby Lobby—is embraced by a large segment of the American public
and has been defended in the hallowed halls of the academy by many esteemed scholars. You
may not agree with the view, but it is not prima facie irrational, like the one held by Christian
Scientists. Second, consider Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972), in which the
Supreme Court carved out an exemption to state compulsory education laws for Amish parents
who wanted to pull their children out of school after eighth grade. Why? Because, writes the
Court, among other things, the Amish “succeed in preparing their high school age children to
be productive members of the Amish community[, . . .] their system of learning through doing
the skills directly relevant to their adult roles in the Amish community . . . [is] ‘ideal,’ and
perhaps superior to ordinary high school education. The evidence also showed that the Amish
have an excellent record as law-abiding and generally self-sufficient members of society.” Id.
at 212–13 (emphasis added).
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sin and its renewal “in the Lord” in the New Covenant of Christ and the
Church . . . [T]he vocation to marriage is written in the very nature of man
and woman as they came from the hand of the Creator. Marriage is not a
purely human institution despite the many variations it may have
undergone through the centuries in different cultures, social structures, and
spiritual attitudes. These differences should not cause us to forget its
common and permanent characteristics. Although the dignity of this
institution is not transparent everywhere with the same clarity, some sense
of the greatness of the matrimonial union exists in all cultures. 142
So, one can know by natural reason what marriage is, but one cannot know that it
is divinely ordained apart from special revelation. It turns out, of course, a wedding is
the one liturgical event (with burial as a possible other exception) that has a secular
counterpart. You cannot, for example, go to city hall and request a civil baptism. 143
For this reason, many religious bodies treat secular weddings that solemnize natural
marriages as presumptively but not necessarily valid, since such bodies are obligated
by their internal legal systems to answer the question as to whether a couple married
outside the church, synagogue, or mosque is in fact really married in the eyes of
God.144
By ignoring the essential place of marriage and weddings in most every religious
tradition, both sets of authors do not address what seems to many of us as the most
profound (and religious) reason some vendors will not cooperate with the celebration
of a same-sex wedding, civil or otherwise: they believe it is an illegitimate rite.
However, given Corvino’s and Girgis’ and Anderson’s view that “religious liberty”
should include conscience protection for even those who are not conventionally
religious, they would likely reply with this question: does that mean that only
conscientious objectors with conventional religious beliefs should be permitted to
refuse cooperation with same-sex weddings? Not necessarily. It would mean that we
would have to extend religious liberty to those citizens either by analogy, in the same
way that we conclude that the right to believe and promulgate atheism falls under
religious free exercise because it answers many of the same questions that religion
answers even though atheism is not technically a religion, 145 or under a different
category, by arguing that the issue under dispute—the nature of human sexuality and
its purposes—is one of those ethical topics about which a politically liberal regime
142

CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, supra note 139, at 16, 42 (footnotes omitted).

143

But you never know. See Francis J. Beckwith, The Baptismal Equality Act of 2040, THE
CATHOLIC THING (May 10, 2013), https://www.thecatholicthing.org/2013/05/10/the-baptismalequality-act-of-2040/.
144 “In the Catholic tradition, for example, a non-sacramental marriage is a real marriage if
it is a natural marriage: a voluntary, permanent, and exclusive union between one man and one
woman not in violation of the rules of consanguinity.” Beckwith, supra note 19.
145 For example, in the Supreme Court cases involving nontheistic conscientious objectors
to military service who wanted to be covered under a federal statute that seemed to only allow
theistic conscientious objectors, the Court justified extending the statute to nontheists by
arguing that the atheist objector’s “beliefs certainly occupy in the life of that individual ‘a place
parallel to that filled by . . . God’ in traditionally religious persons.” Welsh v. United States, 398
U.S. 333, 340 (1970) (quoting United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965)).
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ought to generously tolerate differences of opinion and practice. 146 Regardless, we
should resist the temptation to try to subsume religion under another more manageable
secular category, such as conscience or liberal toleration,147 since doing so diminishes
what believers actually believe about their own beliefs. 148
2. Will the Real Political Liberal Please Stand Up?
One of the fascinating aspects of Debating Religious Liberty and Discrimination
is how the two sets of interlocutors seem to offer arguments that, until recently, would
have been attributed to the other side.
It was not too long ago that the primary arguments for SSM had a general tenor
that went something like this:149 because citizens who oppose the legal recognition of
same-sex marriage attempt to justify their position by appealing to religious and
philosophical reasons that depend on contested worldviews—or what John Rawls calls
“reasonable comprehensive doctrines”150—that other (mostly gay and lesbian) citizens
146

This is similar to approaches taken by John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. See, e.g., JOHN
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 154 (1993); RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE
HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW POLITICAL DEBATE 88 (2006).
147

Conscience, of course, can be a religious category as well. Obviously, both religious
believers and unbelievers can be moved by conscience. However, what I am saying in the text
is that conscience ought not to be used in our public life as either a replacement or substitute for
religion, since they are in fact different things. There are very good reasons for the law to include
conscience protections in a variety of contexts, e.g., for pacifists, pro-life doctors, etc., and I
support such laws. But we should not think of those protections as religious exemptions per se.
Here’s an example of what I mean. In 2014, at a talk I gave at the University of Miami
School of Law, an audience member asked me what I thought about a Florida case involving a
Muslim woman who refused to remove her face covering for her driver's license photograph.
After giving my answer, one of the law school professors, who was invited by my hosts to
offering commentary on my talk, replied to me by saying that this was not a “religious problem”
since the woman could make her case by appealing to a fundamental right to wardrobe choice.
I turned to the professor and said, “But that’s not how this woman understands her predicament.
Her request to wear the hijab for the photo is not like another woman’s choice to shop at The
Gap or Saks Fifth Avenue. For the Muslim woman, it is not a matter of choice. Rather, it is
something she believes that God has commanded her to do. In fact, this is a problem for her,
precisely because she believes she has no choice.” Consequently, for this professor, if you
cannot reduce your religiosity to some apparent right to self-expression or self-definition
independent of any religious content or sacred tradition, then she has no category in which to
place your convictions. Needless to say, this way of assessing religious liberty does not take
rites seriously.
148

149 See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 146, at 87; Elizabeth Brake, Minimal Marriage: What
Political Liberalism Implies for Gay Marriage, ETHICS 120 (January 2010); Linda C. McClain,
Deliberative Democracy, Overlapping Consensus, and Same-Sex Marriage, 66 FORDHAM L.
REV. 1245–46 (1998); FRANK I. MICHELMAN, Rawls on Constitutionalism and Constitutional
Law, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS 411 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003); Martha
Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?: Same Sex Marriage and Constitutional Law, DISSENT MAG.
(2009),
https://www.dissentmagazine.org/article/a-right-to-marry-same-sex-marriage-andconstitutional-law.
150

According to Rawls, reasonable comprehensive doctrines have three main features:

One is that a reasonable doctrine is an exercise of theoretical reason: it covers the major
religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of human life in a more or less consistent
and coherent manner. It organizes and characterizes recognized values so that they are
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are not unreasonable in rejecting, and because the right to marry is a fundamental right,
the government may not justly limit marriage to opposite sex partners. 151
This type of reasoning is rooted in a particular movement within political and legal
philosophy that began in the early 1970s and has produced over subsequent decades a
large and influential body of literature. It has had a profound influence on the way
many academics—especially in philosophy, politics, and law—approach the question
of the legitimacy of coercive laws on contested moral questions. This movement—
whose leading lights include Rawls (1921–2002), Ronald Dworkin (1931–2013),
Judith Jarvis Thomson (1929–persent), and Thomas Nagel (1937–present)—is often
called “Political Liberalism,” a term coined by Rawls in his 1993 book of the same
name.152 According to Rawls, the point of Political Liberalism is to provide an answer
to this problem: “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just
society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious,
philosophical, and moral doctrines?”153 For the Political Liberal, these divisions have
arisen as a consequence of living in a free society in which a wide variety of citizens
from diverse backgrounds come to the public square with differing comprehensive
doctrines or worldviews, such as Christianity, Judaism, Marxism, Kantianism,
Utilitarianism, Islam, and so forth, virtually none of which is obviously unreasonable.
In essence, the Political Liberal argues that, for the government to be justified in
coercing its citizens to obey only one view on any contested moral question, it needs
to provide to dissenting citizens a reason (or reasons) that they would be irrational in
rejecting. So, for example, the pro-life position on abortion is not unreasonable and
may even be the correct view to hold, but it is not irrational for a pro-choice advocate
to reject that view. For this reason, argues the Political Liberal, the state should err on
compatible with one another and express an intelligible view of the world. Each doctrine
will do this in ways that distinguish it from other doctrines, for example, by giving
certain values a particular primacy and weight. In singling out which values to count as
especially significant and how to balance them when they conflict, a reasonable
comprehensive doctrine is also an exercise of practical reason. Both theoretical and
practical reason (including as appropriate the rational) are used together in its
formulation. Finally, a third feature is that while a reasonable comprehensive view is
not necessarily fixed and unchanging, it normally belongs to, or draws upon, a tradition
of thought and doctrine. Although stable over time, and not subject to sudden and
unexplained changes, it tends to evolve slowly in the light of what, from its point of
view, it sees as good and sufficient reasons.
RAWLS, supra note 146, at 59 (emphasis added).
151

This is the way Martha Nussbaum puts it:

[M]arriage is a fundamental liberty right of individuals, and as such it also involves an
equality dimension: groups of people cannot be fenced out of that fundamental right
without some overwhelming reason. It’s like voting: there isn’t a constitutional right to
vote, as some jobs can be filled by appointment. But the minute a state offers voting, it
is unconstitutional to fence out a group of people from the exercise of the right. At this
point, then, the second question arises: Who has this liberty/equality right to marry?
And what reasons are strong enough to override it?
Martha C. Nussbaum, A Right to Marry?, 98 CAL. L. REV. 667, 688 (2010) (emphasis added).
152

RAWLS, supra note 146, at 43–44.

153

Id. at xxv.
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the side of liberty. Thus, the government would not be justified in forbidding a prochoice woman from procuring an abortion, even though her pro-life counterpart would
be perfectly rational in assessing the pro-choice woman’s decision as immoral.154 So,
on any issue over which there is deep disagreement between comprehensive doctrines,
the government should restrain its coercive powers. As Dworkin puts it, “[a] tolerant
secular society . . . could have no reason for embracing freedom of orthodox worship
without also embracing freedom of choice in all ethical matters and therefore freedom
of choice with respect to the ethical values that are plainly implicated in decisions
about sexual conduct, marriage, and procreation.”155
This sort of thinking, or something close to it, is ubiquitous in the Supreme Court’s
opinions supporting the right to use contraception, 156 procure an abortion,157 exercise
religious liberty,158 and engage in homosexual conduct.159 In, for example, Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, a case that re-affirmed the central holding of Roe v. Wade that
there is a constitutional right to abortion, the plurality opinion asserts:
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating to
marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child rearing,
and education . . . . These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.
Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of personhood
were they formed under compulsion of the State. 160

154
Judith Jarvis Thomson, for example, writes: “One side says that the fetus has a right to
life from the moment of conception, the other side denies this. Neither side is able to prove its
case . . . [W]hy should the deniers win? . . . The answer is that the situation is not symmetrical.
What is in question here is not which of two values we should promote, the deniers’ or the
supporters.’ What the supporters want is a license to impose force; what the deniers want is a
license to be free of it. It is the former that needs justification.” Judith Jarvis Thomson, Abortion,
BOSTON REV. (1995), http://bostonreview.net/archives/BR20.3/thomson.html. By quoting
Thomson here, I am not suggesting that her resolution to the abortion debate is correct. In fact,
I argue elsewhere that even if she is correct about the supposed equal non-irrationality of the
differing positions on the abortion issue, laws that prohibit virtually all abortions would still be
justified. See Francis J. Beckwith, Thomson’s “Equal Reasonableness” Argument for Abortion
Rights: A Critique, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 185, 196 (2004).
155

DWORKIN, supra note 146, at 62.

156

Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).

157 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
846 (1992).
158

See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993);
W. Va. State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310
U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
159

Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003).

160

Planned Parenthood, 505 U.S. at 851.
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Thus, it seems, under Political Liberalism, that the state should not coerce the
vendor to cooperate with the celebration of a wedding that he believes is an illegitimate
rite, since what one believes about such matters involves not only “the most intimate
and personal choices a person may make in a lifetime,” but also “one’s own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”161 Oddly,
one could read Girgis and Anderson as making a similar kind of argument when they
offer what they call “principled and pragmatic reasons to avoid the Puritan mistake.”162
They write:
[T]he human good is textured and open ended. There are many honorable
ways to blend the elements of human flourishing. Even in a civilization of
saints, there would be a range of valuable ways of life, with people and
associations giving priority to different goods, pursued in different ways.
Civil liberties exist partly to protect that valuable variety by slowing the
state’s ambitions to achieve important social goals at its expense. This
highlights the need to empower, not encumber, the civic associations that
arise in free societies: principled pluralism.
On the other hand, the state should also tolerate some things that really are
erroneous or harmful or immoral, where the alternative would risk doing
still more harm and little good. This pragmatic pluralism is born of a
healthy humility and a healthy fear. Our powers of reason our limited; our
evidence is limited; and so is our experience—and in different ways for
different people. So where people are free to come to their own conclusions
about matters of right and wrong, religion, and the like, they come to
different conclusions, even when they all act in good faith. 163
This reasoning may seem to some readers as not too much unlike Justice
Kennedy’s reasoning in his majority opinion in Obergefell:
Many who deem same-sex marriage to be wrong reach that conclusion
based on decent and honorable religious or philosophical premises, and
neither they nor their beliefs are disparaged here. But when that sincere,
personal opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary
consequence is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that
soon demeans or stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied164
(emphasis added).

161

Id.

162

CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 148.

163

Id.

164

Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2602 (2015).
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Yet, noted herein, in 2012 Girgis and Anderson co-authored a book arguing against
the legal recognition of same-sex marriage,165 with Anderson publishing a scathing
critique of Justice Kennedy’s reasoning only two months after his 2015 Obergefell
opinion.166 Writing as someone highly sympathetic to both works—as well as to the
case Girgis and Anderson make in Debating Religious Liberty and Discrimination—
I am confident that it will not seem obvious to many indifferent or skeptical readers
how Girgis and Anderson can reconcile the arguments they make in this volume under
review with the ones they make in their 2012 and 2015 publications. 167
As for the other side of this debate, Corvino rebuffs the old adage that you should
“dance with the one that brung ya.” For he has eschewed much of (though not entirely)
the Political Liberalism that philosophically grounded what turned out to be the
winning argument in Obergefell. It is a liberalism, as we have seen, that suggests a
kind of epistemic modesty when it comes to employing government coercion on issues
over which reasonable citizens of good will may disagree. It is the sort of liberalism
that, if fully inculcated in our souls, makes us bristle at the idea of the government
forcing Jehovah’s Witness grammar school students to salute the flag, 168 conscripting
Quakers into the military,169 requiring the Little Sisters of the Poor to cooperate with
the purchase of birth control,170 ordering the police to raid a gay bar and imprison its
patrons,171 revoking the tax-exempt status of a Christian college because it wants to

165

GIRGIS ET AL., supra note 146.

166

RYAN T. ANDERSON, TRUTH OVERRULED: THE FUTURE
FREEDOM 59–67 (2015).

OF

MARRIAGE

AND

RELIGIOUS

167 It seems to me that the key to reconciling these arguments is, unfortunately, buried in a
citation in an endnote on page 292 of Debating Religious Liberty and Discrimination. Girgis
and Anderson cite St. Thomas Aquinas’ discussions of the limits of human law in Summa
Theologica I.II, Q96, arts. 2, 3. Perhaps in a future work one or both of them can explain how
Aquinas’ reasoning allows them to, on the one hand, argue against the liberty of individuals to
have their same-sex unions legally recognized while, on the other hand, arguing for religious
liberty exemptions that allow vendors to refuse to cooperate with the celebration of same-sex
weddings. CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 292 n.30.
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follow the teachings of its church,172 or fining Aaron and Melissa Klein into oblivion
unless they make and design a same-sex wedding cake.173
However, in recent years, Political Liberalism has, in some legal and academic
circles, given way to what I call Hegemonic Liberalism,174 a view that seems to shun
the epistemic modesty of its philosophical predecessor while in some ways mimicking
the mission of the traditional moralist. For the Political Liberal, the state should not
only abjure coercion of its citizens on contested moral and religious questions, it
should, for the sake of civil peace, provide legal means by which members of
idiosyncratic sects and holders of minority views receive exemptions to neutral and
generally applicable laws.175 But, for the Hegemonic Liberal, an important task of
government and its many regulative agencies and commissions is to inculcate moral
virtue in its citizens, as the Hegemonic Liberal understands moral virtue. This project
cultivates in its disciples a kind of social justice scrupulosity, 176 often manifested in
the call to assertively nudge (or coerce) the actions, speech, and private associations
of those who remain skeptical of the direction of the progressive faction in the culture
war.177
My own reading of Corvino is that he wants to rhetorically stake out a middle
ground between both types of Liberalism, without conceding the moral high ground
and monopoly on rationality that he attributes to his own views on human sexuality
and SSM. One gets a sense of this philosophical splitting of the difference in a 2009
article he published in The Humanist:
I don’t pretend to understand why seemingly reasonable and decent people
adopt what strikes me as an obviously wrongheaded position on marriage
equality. I think the reasons are various and complex, though they typically
involve a distortion of rationality caused by other commitments, such as
religious bias.
172 For example, Nussbaum writes: “Another government intervention that was right, in my
view, was the judgment that Bob Jones University should lose its tax exemption for its ban on
interracial dating . . . Here the Supreme Court agreed that the ban was part of that sect's religion,
and thus that the loss of tax-exempt status was a ‘substantial burden’ on the exercise of that
religion, but they said that society has a compelling interest in not cooperating with racism.
Never has the government taken similar steps against the many Roman Catholic universities
that restrict their presidencies to a priest, hence a male; but in my view they should all lose their
tax exemptions for this reason.” Martha Nussbaum, Beyond the Veil: A Response, N.Y. TIMES:
OPINIONATOR (July 15, 2010), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/07/15/beyond-theveil-a-response/.
173

See Klein v. Bureau of Labor & Indus., 410 P.3d 1051, 1060 (Or. Ct. App. 2017).
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I first employed the term “Hegemonic Liberalism” in Beckwith, supra note 122.

175 See e.g., Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 200bb-1 (2017); 10 U.S.C. §
247 (2016); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 236 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398,
403 (1963).
176 See JONATHAN HAIDT, THE RIGHTEOUS MIND: WHY GOOD PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED
POLITICS AND RELIGION (2012).
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177 See Michele Goldberg, The Worst Time for the Left to Give Up on Free Speech, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 26, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/opinion/liberals-freespeech.html.
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But I also recognize that my opponents do, or should, wonder the same
thing about me—and the ever-growing number of reasonable and decent
Americans who support marriage equality. Which leaves us with a few
choices:
We can call each other crazy and stupid, or bigoted, or deviant. This is
generally not helpful.
(2) We can pretend that we're above all that, but complain that the other
side is doing it . . . .
(3) We can actually engage the substance of each other's positions. I can
understand why those with poorly supported positions would want to avoid
this option. It doesn't necessarily make them bigots, but it doesn't reflect
very well on them, either.178
But, when it comes to the question at hand—the application of anti-discrimination
laws to wedding vendors who are SSM conscientious objectors—Corvino’s
commitment to rhetorically staking out a middle ground may appear to some of his
compatriots to result in its own “distortion of rationality,” to borrow an apt phrase. Let
me explain. Corvino correctly notes that there is a very good case to be made for
passing and enforcing anti-discrimination laws in public accommodations for the
purpose of eliminating entrenched prejudices that have over time harmed certain
groups.179 And, as is well-known, many of the most renowned Political Liberals have
defended such laws as well.180 So, to honor the religious liberty of certain vendors,
while at the same time not undermining the integrity of anti-discrimination laws,
Corvino is willing to make a distinction between custom-made products and “off the
shelf” ones.181 There is, after all, a difference between a Muslim baker refusing to sell
a cake from his display case because the customer is a Christian, and that same baker
refusing to fulfill the request of a Christian customer to make and design a cake in the
image of Muhammed or with the inscription, “Islam is a false religion.”182
According to Corvino:
[D]rawing the line at custom services helps to underscore an important
principle: If a business is willing and able to sell an item to some customers,
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John Corvino, Gay Marriage and the ‘Bigot Card,’ 69 HUMANIST 1, 7, 8 (2009).
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CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 68–94.
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See, e.g., ANDREW KOPPLEMAN, ANTIDISCRIMINATION LAW
(1998).
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CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 83–85.
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See, for example, the strange case of the ShopRite baker refusing to design a cake to
celebrate the birthday of a 3-year-old named after Adolf Hitler. Carly Rothman, Child Named
After Adolf Hitler Is Refused Cake Request, STAR-LEDGER (N.J.) (Dec. 16, 2008),
https://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2008/12/child_named_after_adolf_hitler.html.
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it is wrong for them to refuse the very same item to other customers on the
basis of the customers’ race, religion, sexual orientation, and so on.183
Making a similar observation in her concurring opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
Justice Elena Kagan notes that a “vendor can choose the products he sells, but not the
customers he serves—no matter the reason. Phillips sells wedding cakes. As to that
product, he unlawfully discriminates: He sells it to opposite-sex but not to same-sex
couples.”184 This, at first glance, seems to make sense, especially if we think of the
wide variety of “very same items” that are found in virtually every collection of retail
outlets throughout America: groceries clothing, soap, cars, donuts, Chinese food,
alcoholic beverages, appliances, etc. But, we need to take a second glance, because
sometimes what appears to be the “very same item” to Mr. Philosopher (or Ms.
Justice), is not the “very same item” for Mr. Pious. And this is particularly true in the
cases that have found their way into the courts. For, as we have already seen, these
involve vendors who refused to cooperate with the planning, celebration, or
commemoration of a particular type of ceremony, event, or venue, irrespective of the
status of the customer or the customization of the service or product. In such cases,
what may appear to Corvino, or some other onlooker, as “the very same item,” in the
mind of the vendor is actually a different item precisely because of the nature of the
ceremony, event, or venue.
Consider the following cases. Meet Ms. Stained-Glass.185 After years of study and
apprenticeship, she goes into business for herself. Not wanting to be too ambitious,
she decides to make only four different types of stained-glass panels: a rose; a
lighthouse; a Cheshire Cat; and the Virgin Mary with Child. Suppose she makes one
identical copy of each panel over the course of one year. So, at the end of her first year
in business, she has “on the shelf,” twelve identical copies of each panel—forty-eight
in total. Customers contact her via Facebook, place their order, and she mails them a
panel. Some order a rose, while others order a Cheshire Cat or lighthouse, but most of
her customers buy the Virgin Mary with Child. It is clear that virtually all the
customers who purchase that panel, like Ms. Stained-Glass, are devout Catholics,
including two priests and a nun. One day she receives an order for the Virgin Mary
panel from the manager of a brothel in Nevada, Ms. Pander.186 Stunned by the request,
Ms. Stained-Glass asks Ms. Pander, “Out of curiosity, where do you plan on
displaying the panel?” She answers, “In the foyer of the brothel above the fireplace,
with this inscription below, ‘You’ll never meet her here.’” Ms. Stained-Glass refuses
to sell the panel to Ms. Pander, because she cannot in good conscience allow the fruit
of her artistic labor and creativity to be used in such a blasphemous way. But,
183

CORVINO, ANDERSON & GIRGIS, supra note 2, at 84.

Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Co. Civil Rights Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1733 n.* (2018)
(Kagan, J., concurring).
184

185
Since my wife, Frankie, is a stained-glass artist, you can imagine this is her if you would
like to.
186

I grew up in Nevada, where prostitution is permissible under state law in any county with
a population of less than 700,000. Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 244.345(8) (2017). So, it is not legal
in either Reno or Las Vegas (my home town). It is also not legal in the state capital, Carson
City, which is a city independent of any county (like Washington D.C. is in relation to the
separate states).
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according to Corvino, because the panel was not custom made and it is identical to the
others sold to the priests and nun, it would be unjust for Ms. Stained-Glass to not sell
Ms. Pander the panel. In response, Corvino would likely reply: But a “brothel
manager” is not a protected class. While this may be true, the point of this example is
simply to show that what constitutes “the very same item” is more difficult than
Corvino imagines.
Nevertheless, we can change the story a bit so that the customer is a member of a
protected class. For example, instead of receiving an order from Ms. Pander, Ms.
Stained-Glass receives one from Mr. Splitfoot—high priest of the First Church of
Satan, Waco. Identifying himself as a minister, Mr. Splitfoot orders the Virgin Mary
panel. Because he does not seem to be a Catholic priest, Ms. Stained-Glass asks Mr.
Splitfoot, “What is the name of the congregation at which you are a minister?” When
he answers, “Church of Satan,” Ms. Stained-Glass becomes visibly shaken. She then
inquires, “Why would you want to hang my panel of the Virgin Mary in your so-called
church?” Mr. Splitfoot replies, “Here’s why: We’re going to hang it on the back wall
above the altar, where we celebrate the black mass. And we’ve hired an engraver to
write on the wall right above the panel, ‘You’ll never meet her here.’” Shocked at the
desecration, she refuses to sell Mr. Splitfoot the panel. However, according to
Corvino, because the item is not custom made and because the religion in question is
a protected class, Ms. Stained-Glass must sell Mr. Splitfoot the panel or suffer the
appropriate civil penalties.
As another example, imagine Ms. Stained-Glass receives yet another order from
another prospective customer. This time, the order is from Ms. Indigo. Like Ms.
Pander and Mr. Splitfoot, Ms. Indigo places an order for the Virgin Mary with Child
panel. She tells Ms. Stained-Glass that the panel would look lovely on the back wall
of the bar that is owned by her and her spouse. “Does your bar have a particular theme?
Is it a sports bar, a cowboy bar?” asks Ms. Stained-Glass. “No,” answers Ms. Indigo,
“it’s a lesbian bar.” Ms. Stained-Glass replies, “In that case, I’m curious. Why would
you want that panel in your bar?” “Because,” responds Ms. Indigo, “the name of the
bar is ‘Bloody Mary’s.’ In fact, after I put the panel behind the bar, we’re going to
place a banner below it that says ‘You’ll never meet her here.’” Ms. Stained-Glass is
horrified at the sacrilege. But, according to Corvino, because the item is not custom
made and because sexual-orientation is a protected class, Ms. Stained-Glass must sell
Ms. Indigo the panel or suffer the appropriate civil penalties.
I think it is clear from these cases, contra Corvino and Justice Kagan, that Ms.
Stained-Glass’s refusal to sell the “very same item” to one customer, rather than
another, was not “on the basis of the customers’ race, religion, sexual orientation, and
so on,”187 but rather, on the basis of a conscientious religious judgment that it would
be morally wrong, or cause scandal, to cooperate with the planning, celebration, or
commemoration of a particular type of ceremony, event, or venue, regardless of the
customer’s protected status.188
187
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Interestingly, Justice Neil Gorsuch, in his concurring opinion in Masterpiece Cakeshop,
suggests a similar way to think about these cases:
It is no more appropriate for the United States Supreme Court to tell Mr. Phillips that a
wedding cake is just like any other—without regard to the religious significance his
faith may attach to it—than it would be for the Court to suggest that for all persons
sacramental bread is just bread or a kippah is just a cap.
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IV. CONCLUSION
This article began with an overview of the differing understandings of religious
liberty in the American Founding. As we have seen, these contested perspectives are
still with us today in the disputes over religious liberty and anti-discrimination laws.
Unfortunately, if you rely almost exclusively on social media to inform you about this
issue, you are not only likely to be misinformed, you are subjecting yourself to a style
of managing disagreement that atrophies the rational faculties. Debating Religious
Liberty and Discrimination is the perfect antidote. Corvino, Girgis, and Anderson are
wonderfully engaging thinkers, writing with clarity, intelligence, and verve. But, best
of all, they provide a superb model on how the rest of us mere mortals ought to engage
in public debate over controversial moral questions that often challenge our powers of
forbearance and charity.
Although, as should be evident, I have my doubts about some of the arguments
offered by both sides, I am fairly certain that arguments, by themselves, do not have
the power to heal the divisions in our culture. But, what may give us a fighting chance
is the sort of friendship and mutual respect that Girgis, Anderson, and Corvino no
doubt have for each other. May their tribe increase.

Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1739–40 (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Because I had
developed my own argument months before Masterpiece Cakeshop had been decided, I was
pleased to see the trajectory of Justice Gorsuch’s reasoning.
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